



Lord Inverchapel's request for  
guidance on the political situation here.

I attach a copy of Washington telegram No. 6727 and a draft reply, paragraphs 1 - 3 of which were drafted by Major Mayhew after consultation with the Whips' Office.

The last sentence of paragraph 5 of the draft refers to the draft telegram which I understand was submitted to the Prime Minister by Sir Orme Sargent yesterday afternoon. If that telegram should be despatched before the present draft, paragraph 5 will require a small consequential amendment.

The Prime Minister has asked to see our draft reply to Washington telegram No. 6727.

RH22.4

V. N. Dept.

M. H. M.  
RH22.  
Re.

Wilson-Young

I.A.D. Wilson-Young.  
22nd November, 1946

I think that the line in para. 5 of the draft is the right reply for our Naval Attaché in Washington; but in case it is desired to avoid a word like "assurance", I have pencilled an alternative wording.

Minister 5/17.

SG.

M. Butcher  
22/xi

RS/12

*It is in  
submitting  
to day  
P.T.*

AM 3641

98

Cypher/OIP.

23 P R I S E C.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel. D. 9.56 p.m. 20th November 1946.  
No. 6727.

20th November 1946. R. 3.25 a.m. 21st November 1946.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

W:V:W:V:W

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Majority opinion has been impressed by the Vote of Confidence which the House of Commons gave to His Majesty's Government. In Conservative quarters the revolt by Labour back-benchers against the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government has been compared to the attack upon United States foreign policy at the time of the Wallace episode and it is widely hoped that Monday's Vote in the House will settle the issue as decisively in Britain as the crisis in the United States was resolved.

2. At the same time thoughtful elements, who have hitherto assumed that no more than sixty Labour Members of Parliament were critical of His Majesty's Government are somewhat shaken by the number of abstentions.

(N.B. The Associated Press has reported that the British Press Association estimates the number of Labour Members failing to vote as between 100 and 150). It has been noted by some commentators that the arguments of the dissident Members of Parliament centered round the allegation that Britain was aligning herself too closely with the United States. More than one commentator has suggested that the recent Republican victory has swollen the ranks of the dissidents. Whilst, excepting on the Left-Wing and by irresponsible sensation-mongers such as Drew Pearson, there is little disposition to assert that a reversal of Britain's foreign policy is impending there is great interest and some concern in United States official quarters at the apparent extent of the revolt. It is noteworthy in this connexion that, in the course of a conversation on the 19th November with a senior British naval officer, the Chief of United States American Naval Intelligence said that he was perturbed at the number of abstentions and hoped that this did not foreshadow a more pronounced trend in Britain away from a common front with the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

3. The importance of the Chief of Naval Intelligence's remarks in private talk should not be exaggerated. But he holds a key position in the Naval Department and exercises an influence in Anglo-American naval collaboration disproportionate to his rank. If therefore he were to entertain serious doubts of Britain's future foreign policy, it would be easy for him to place difficulties in the way of naval collaboration and he would probably do so. The Acting

Military

Military Attaché has so far been unable to discover any comparable sign of such misgivings in United States military circles.

4. In the above-mentioned circumstances, the Naval Attaché who has been planning in any case to have an interview with Admiral Inglis early next week, proposes to seek an opportunity to disabuse his mind of any fears that he may have as to the extent to which the United States can in fact rely upon Great Britain. Both for this purpose and to enable members of my staff to ensure that the Americans with whom they are in touch see these developments at home in proper perspective, I would appreciate such further guidance as you can give me, especially as regards the true number and significance of the abstentions from the division in the House of Commons on the 18th November.



AN 3641/15/6

10, Downing Street, 100  
Whitehall.

IMMEDIATE.

21st November, 1946.

N.A. Dept are you drafting? If not, would you  
please?

Dear John

JD  
21/11.

The Prime Minister has seen  
Lord Inverchapel's telegram Number  
6727 of the 20th November, and wishes  
to see the proposed reply in draft.  
Would you please arrange accordingly?

Yours sincerely

James John-Henry

J.P.E.C. Henniker, Esq., M.C.,  
Foreign Office.

Draft. ~~Minister~~  
9B

Prime Minister.

101

I attach a draft telegram  
in reply to Washington telegram  
No 6727 of the 20<sup>th</sup> November,  
about the U. S. reaction to the  
decision in Mr. Compton's  
critical amendment. Paragraphs  
1-3 were drafted by Major Mayhew.

BBK/22

Draft.

Mr. Wilson-Young.

Later calculations show that the number of deliberate abstentions has been exaggerated. It was not more than 80 and may have been less than 70. The amendment had 57 signatories, including a very high proportion of ~~the~~ youngest and ~~most~~ inexperienced "intellectual" M.Ps. It was skillfully worded and undoubtedly brought <sup>full,</sup> in several M.Ps. who did not ~~realise its true~~ ~~to~~ significance. ~~of what they were doing.~~

The original sponsors of the amendment deliberately excluded ~~co~~~~workers~~ and fellow-travellers, who signed later. Critics generally were anxious not to align themselves with current Moscow-inspired attacks on the Government. Crossman's strictures on Communism and the ~~Soviet Union in its~~ <sup>anti-</sup> British diplomatic and ~~of the Soviet Union,~~ propaganda offensive, though ~~highly~~ unpalatable to a very small section of the party, undoubtedly reflect the views of an ever-growing majority of Labour M.P.S. Perhaps for this very reason, <sup>emphasise their</sup> some of them feel that they must ~~show their~~ <sup>Left-wing position</sup> ~~socialist faith in other directions~~, and the outcome is a demand for a doctrinaire Socialist foreign policy, <sup>combined</sup> complete with outspoken criticism of the U.S.A.

<sup>21/11.</sup>  
<sup>RH 24</sup>  
Critics will apparently not try to form an opposition group; and it is indeed impossible for ~~right-wing~~ critics, such as Foot and Crossman to cohere with Zilliacus, Platts-Mills and others of the extreme left. The two wings are already publicly attacking each other. The majority feeling in the party, especially among Trade Union MPs. shows considerable resentment against the critics.

Rotherhithe and North Paddington by-election  
successes ~~are considered to show~~<sup>confirm</sup> that the policy  
of H.M.G. receives overwhelming support from  
public opinion.

I.A.D.W.Y.

Draft.

Lord Inverchapel  
Washington.

Telegram.

No.

Date.

Cypher O.T.P.

Departmental No. 2.

*I have made out  
a sketch in red  
21/11*

U.N. Dept. ) first.  
Mr. Heppel )

*Wilson. G.W.*

22/11

*Despatched*

*M.*

November 1946.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Your telegram No. 6727 *L* of the 20th November  
significance of developments in connection with  
Mr. Crossman's critical amendment *J*.

Later calculations show that the number of  
deliberate abstentions has been exaggerated.  
It was not more than 80 and may have been less  
than 70. The amendment had 57 signatories,  
including a very high proportion of young and  
inexperienced "intellectual" M.P.s. It was  
skilfully worded and undoubtedly brought in  
several M.P.s who did not fully realise the  
significance of what they were doing.

2. The original sponsors of the amendment  
" " "  
deliberately excluded cryptoes and fellow-  
travellers, who signed later. Critics generally  
were anxious not to align themselves with current  
Moscow-inspired attacks on the Government.  
Crossman's strictures on Communism and the anti-  
British diplomatic and propaganda offensive of  
the Soviet Union, though unpalatable to a very  
small section of the party, undoubtedly reflect  
the views of an ever-growing majority of Labour  
M.P.s. Perhaps for this very reason, some of  
them feel that they must emphasise their Left-  
wing position, and the outcome is a demand for  
a doctrinaire Socialist foreign policy, *combined*  
*continued*  
with outspoken criticism of the U.S.A.

3. Critics will apparently not try to form an opposition group; and it is indeed impossible for critics such as Foot and Crossman to cohere with Zilliacus, Platts-Mills and others of the extreme left. The two wings are already publicly attacking each other. The majority feeling in the party, especially among Trade Union M.P.s., shows considerable resentment against the critics. Rotherhithe and North Paddington by-election successes confirm that the policy of H.M.G. receives overwhelming support from public opinion.

4. I hope that foregoing paragraphs will enable you and members of your staff to put these political developments into proper perspective. You may also think it advisable to inform consular posts as well as B.I.S.

5. While your Naval Attaché will no doubt find ~~paragraphs~~ <sup>this material</sup> valuable as background <sup>for</sup> ~~information~~ in his forthcoming interview with Admiral Inglis, I think it would be preferable for him not to ~~enter~~ <sup>go outside his beat by embarking</sup> on a discussion of general political questions including the degree of reliability of this country ~~as~~ in matters of ~~military~~ co-operation. The Navy Department will ~~find the best assurance on this~~ <sup>be able to form their own judgment on the basis of</sup> ~~Such practical measures as~~ <sup>such practical measures as</sup> ~~point in~~ the reply which we are asking you to return to the U.S. Government's suggestion for the continuation of the wartime arrangements ~~governing naval visits~~ <sup>for the mutual</sup> grant of facilities for naval visits (your ref. no 6228 [of 26<sup>th</sup> Oct.])

88/522

AN 3642/G

104

2.

NORTH AMERICAN

AN 3642/15/G.  
hr. 45-5

(No. 10)

to Mr. Henricks.

Dated: Nov. 24.

Rec'd: Nov. 27.

U.S. Reaction to the ~~the~~ Division on  
hr. Grossman's Critical Amendment.Refers to Sir O. Benten's minute  
to the P. hr. No. PM/46/204 of Nov. 22  
(AN 3641/15/G). States that the P. hr.  
approves the despatch of the draft  
tel. in reply to Wton te. No. 6727 of  
Nov. 20 (AN 3641/G), subject to an  
addition to the first paragraph.

(Minutes.)

R3/12

Last Paper.  
(AN 3641).

## References.

SAC, Geneva

PA

DEE

HISTORICAL PAPERS

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. Wton No. 1111.  
Nov. 25.Copied Mr. Hash  
(Min. Dept.),  
Mr. Hawley  
(Northern Dept.),  
Mr. Hamilton  
(A. T. Dept.)  
Dec. 2d.(Action  
completed.)

R. J. A.

(Index.)

W.P.

Next Paper.

AN 3740



Mr. Phipphey <sup>AN</sup> is off  
Sir — <sup>Re</sup> S. — <sup>and add</sup> 600

105

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

TOP SECRET

24th November, 1946.

AN3642

Dear Henniker,

Will you please let Sir Orme Sargent know that the Prime Minister has seen his minute (PM/46/204) of the 22nd November and approves the dispatch of the draft telegram in reply to ~~lively~~ Washington telegram No. 6727 of the 20th November about the United States reaction to the division on Mr. Crossman's critical amendment, subject to the addition of the following sentence at the end of the first paragraph. "It is significant that there were a number of Jewish members among the abstainers; this was due, no doubt, to their anxiety about Palestine."

Yours sincerely,

Hinkler

J.P.E.C. Henniker, Esq., M.C.,  
Foreign Office.

11/11

106.

Lord Inverchapel  
WASHINGTON.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

1111

Jan. 28-4.

CYPHER

DFP.

It is significant that there were a number of Jewish members among the abstainers; this was due, no doubt, to their anxiety about Palestine.

XXXXXX  
XXXX

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2

Approved by the  
P.M.

ipis to

Mr Nash (News Dept)  
Mr Hankey (N. Dept)  
Mr Hamilton (A. I. D.)

*free ec*  
Your telegram No. 6727 of the 20th November: significance of developments in connection with Mr. Crossman's critical amendment.

Later calculations show that the number of deliberate abstentions has been exaggerated. It was not more than 80 and may have been less than 70. The amendment had 57 signatories, including a very high proportion of young and inexperienced "intellectual" M.P.s. It was skilfully worded and undoubtedly brought in several M.P.s who did not fully realise the significance of what they were doing.

2. The original sponsors of the amendment deliberately excluded "cryptoes" and fellow-travellers, who signed later. Critics generally were anxious not to align themselves with current Moscow-inspired attacks on the Government. Crossman's strictures on Communism and the anti-British diplomatic and propaganda offensive of the Soviet Union, though unpalatable to a very small section of the party, undoubtedly reflect the views of an ever-growing majority of Labour M.P.s. Perhaps for this very reason, some of them feel that they must emphasise their Left-wing position, and the outcome is a demand for a doctrinaire Socialist foreign policy, combined with outspoken criticism of the U.S.A.

3. Critics will apparently not try to form an opposition group; and it is indeed impossible for critics such as Foot and Crossman to cohere with Zilliacus, Platts-Mills and others of the extreme left. The two wings are already publicly attacking each other. The majority feeling in the party, especially among Trade Union M.P.s, shows considerable resentment against the critics. Rotherhithe and North Paddington by-election successes confirm that the policy of H.M.G. receives steady and overwhelming support from public opinion.

4. I hope that foregoing paragraphs will enable you and members of your staff to put these political developments into proper perspective. You may also think it advisable to inform consular posts as well as B.I.S.

5. While your Naval Attaché will no doubt find this material valuable as background for his forthcoming interview with Admiral Inglis, I think it would be preferable for him not to go outside his beat by embarking on a discussion of general political questions including the ~~degree~~ of reliability of this country in matters of military co-operation. The Navy Department will be able to form their own judgment as to this from such practical matters as the reply which we are about to ask you to return to the U.S. Government's suggestion for the continuation of the wartime arrangements for the mutual grant of facilities for naval visits (your telegram No. 6228 [of 24th October]).

U.S.  
25/11

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 11111

25th November, 1946

D. 5.0 p.m. 25th November, 1946

ccccccc

IMMEDIATETOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 6727 [of the 20th November: significance of developments in connexion with Mr. Crossman's critical amendment].

Later calculations show that the number of deliberate abstentions has been exaggerated. It was not more than 80 and may have been less than 70. The amendment had 57 signatories, including a very high proportion of young and inexperienced "intellectual" M.P.s. It was skilfully worded and undoubtedly brought in several M.P.s who did not fully realise the significance of what they were doing. It is significant that there were a number of Jewish members among the abstainers; this was due, no doubt, to their anxiety about Palestine.

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3. Critics will apparently not try to form an opposition group; and it is indeed impossible for critics such as Foot and Crossman to cohere with Zilliacus, Platts-Mills and others of the extreme left. The two wings are already publicly attacking each other. The majority feeling in the party, especially among Trade Union M.P.s, shows considerable resentment against the critics. Rotherhithe and North Paddington by-election successes confirm that the policy of His Majesty's Government receives steady and overwhelming support from public opinion.

4. I hope that foregoing paragraphs will enable you and members of your staff to put these political developments into proper perspective. You may also think it advisable to inform consular posts as will as B.I.S.

/5. While

5. While your Naval Attaché will no doubt find this material valuable as background for his forthcoming interview with Admiral Inglis, I think it would be preferable for him not to go outside his beat by embarking on a discussion of general political questions including the degree of reliability of this country in matters of military co-operation. The Navy Department will be able to form their own judgment as to this from such practical matters as the reply which we are about to ask you to return to the United States Government's suggestion for the continuation of the wartime arrangements for the mutual grant of facilities for naval visits (your telegram No. 6228 [of 24th October]).

43

1946

AN

AN 3740

109

UNITED STATES

1046

President Truman's Policy on the Palestine Question

Describes United States Communist dissatisfaction with President Truman's failure to implement his protestations against British Policy in Palestine, and outlines Communist Party views on this question.

Registry Number } AN 3740/15/45

FROM Mr. Sinclair,  
(New York) to Mr. Rundall

No. RS. hdb.

Dated 26th Nov. 1946.

Received } in Registry 9th Dec. 1946

Last Paper.

AN 3641

References.

(Print.)

See minutes within:  
(Minutes.)

Abel 12/12

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Sinclair,  
(British Consul-General,  
New York)  
from Mr. Rundall.

Dec. 10  
FOR PERMANENT PRESERVATION

PAPERS ON THIS FILE HAVE  
BEEN CITED IN OFFICIAL  
INSTITUTIONS OR PUBLICATIONS.

(Action completed.)

MBS 12/12

(Index.)

A. 11/107

Next Paper.

~~AN 3749~~

~~110~~

The bit about the "Ukrainian Consulate" at New York puzzles me. I had not heard of it before. Is there one, and when was it established, and have the Americans asked for any Consulate in the Ukraine in return? If there is no inf. in the F. B. I. files, it would be worth while asking New York. The subject is of considerable interest to N. Dept.

Thomas Brincker  
7/12/46.

~~AN 122 15 45 INDEXED~~

M: Freyberg: Eastern Sect  
M: Rabinow: Northern ..  
may come  
See. 111

New York.

18th, 20/11

RS;hdb

AN 3740  
9 DEC 1946

26th November 1946

Dear Tony,

Now that the Ball is over, here goes for a further few lines.

The Elections are at last over, with the results that are already known to you. It was interesting and almost pathetic to note the efforts of the Communists to rally their Jewish followers to the Democratic banner in the face of the Zionist organisations' hostility towards the Truman administration for "betraying the Zionist cause". While the Communists had to admit that the Truman policy on Palestine had throughout been treacherous and reprehensible, to lend support to the Republican forces of reaction was even more damnable.

The failure of Truman to implement his protestations against British policy in Palestine, is, say the Communists, just a part of the Administration's policy to achieve Anglo-Saxon political, economic, cultural and social domination of the World. The promises made by Truman were nothing but a vote-catching manoeuvre to win political support from the Jewish electorate.

Although Truman pretends to favour the programme of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, this, say the Communists, merely aggravates the crisis instead of solving it, while Attlee's rejection of Truman's proposals only sharpens their respective imperialist rivalries.

But greatly as the Democrats have erred in Communist eyes, the Republicans are completely beyond the pale. Their differences with the Democrats are simply based on the fact that the latter are not imperialist enough.

For the rest, the Communist party line in so far as Palestine is concerned, consists in clamouring for the abrogation

F.B.A. Rundall - 2

of the British Mandate and the transfer of Palestine to the United Nations, thereby assuring a voice for Russia in the future control of that country, not to mention that little toe-hold with which they would hope to climb ultimately into a place of control.

In lighter vein, the following might amuse you. The chief interpreter for Russian into English with the U.N. (he is an Englishman) told me the other day that he had recently been given the credentials of the Ukrainian delegation to translate into English. They were written in Ukrainian, which is, as you know, reasonably similar to Russian. My friend, therefore, had little difficulty in rendering the credentials into English, but found himself in doubt regarding one single word. He therefore rang up the Ukrainian Consulate in New York, and asked them if they could give him the meaning of it. To his amusement, the reply came back that there was not a single person in the Ukrainian Consulate who spoke, or knew anything about Ukrainian. They were all Russians!

Yours ever,

F.B.A.  
Rundall

F.B.A. Rundall, Esq. O.B.E.  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Registry

o.

A N. 3740

113<sup>60</sup>  
115/45

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

*Draft* *fb* F.B.A.R.

R. Sinclair Esq.,  
O.B.E.,  
British Consulate-  
General,  
NEW YORK.

*from M.  
Rundall*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10 December, 1946.

Dear Louie,

Thank you very much for your letter of November 26th, which is most interesting. Your chums seem to be having a bad time and from the preliminary account are going to find it more than usually difficult to laugh off Budenz.

Northern Department are very interested in your story about the Ukrainian Consulate in New York. They would like to know when it was established and also whether the Americans have asked, or are going to ask, for a post in the ~~UKRAINE~~ <sup>in</sup> Ukraine in return. As you know, any news of official Russian or "stooge" offices being opened is always welcome.

Yours ever, *Det. 9/12*  
*Tom (Sgt.) F.B.A. RUNDALL.*

P.S. All the best to you  
Yeddie for Christmas.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10th December, 1946. 114

(A.N. 3740/15/45)

Dear Lourie,

Thank you very much for your letter of November 26th, which is most interesting. Your chums seem to be having a bad time and from the preliminary account are going to find it more than usually difficult to laugh off Budenz.

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Yours ever,  
Tommy  
(Sgd.) (F.B.I. Rundall)

P.S. All the best to you  
R. Sinclair, Esq., O.B.E.,  
New York. Eddie for Christmas.